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A contractual stipulation determining a forum in which par-
ties wish to litigate future disputes, commonly referred to as a
forum selection clause,' serves a number of laudable interests.
The clause provides certainty and predictability as to the place
of litigation.2 By designating a certain forum, parties will be
able to choose a court which is both convenient and expert.3
Additionally, the clause brings economic advantages to the con-
tractual parties and the courts. Parties know where their re-
course lies should a disagreement arise and, therefore, are able
to take into consideration the cost of prospective litigation when
negotiating the value of the contract.4 As recently noted by the
* A substantial portion of this article is based on a thesis submitted to the
faculty of the National Law Center of the George Washington University in partial
satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of master of laws.
** Teaching Assistant, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Faculty of Law.
LL.B., Bar-flan University, Israel, 1990, LL.M., The George Washington University
National Law Center, 1994, Dr. Jur. (candidate), The Hebrew University of Jerusa-
lem. The author wishes to thank Professor Ralph G. Steinhardt of The George
Washington University National Law Center who supervised the thesis. The author
also wishes to thank Professors Stephen Goldstein and Celia Wasserstein Fassberg of
The Hebrew University Faculty of Law, and Mr. John L. Habib, Esq. and Mr.
Khalid M. Rabbani, Esq. for their helpful comments, support and encouragement.
1. A forum selection clause is also referred to by a number of terms, such as
"forum selection agreement," "forum clause," "choice of forum agreement" and "juris-
diction agreement." See M. Richard Cutter, Comparative Conflicts of Law: Effective-
ness of Contractual Choice of Forum, 20 TEx. INfT L.J. 97, 98 n.3 (1985) (citations
omitted). These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this article.
Different terms are also used to describe the court selected by the parties.
Such a court can be referred to as a "selected forum/court," a "contractual fo-
rum/court" and a "designated forum/court." Henceforth, these terms are also used
interchangeably. A court not designated by the parties will be referred to as the
"noncontractual forum/court."
2. James T. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate
Contracts, 65 KY. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1976).
3. Gilbert, supra note 2, at 3.
4. See Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exports Ltd., 28 F.3d 600, 604
1009
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 34:1009
United States Supreme Court, by giving effect to forum agree-
ments, a court is spared the burden of pretrial motions to deter-
mine the correct forum, thereby conserving judicial resources.'
Some have also suggested that forum agreements have a role in
advancing harmony in international trade law,' and in promot-
ing comity and respect toward other jurisdictions.7
Although the idea embodied in a forum agreement seems
simple and serves a number of praiseworthy interests, until
recently American courts almost unanimously held such clauses
to be invalid as against public policy.' The reason frequently
given for this public policy objection was that it is not a matter
for the parties to a forum agreement to regulate the jurisdiction
of courts; this matter was considered to lie solely within the
legislature's domain! Therefore, public policy did not tolerate a
(7th Cir. 1994) (a party agreeing to litigate abroad is presumed to have received
some compensation for the risk); Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363
(2d Cir.) (forum agreements should principally be enforceable because the financial
effect of a forum selection clause will be reflected in the value of the contract) (cita-
tions omitted), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 385 (1993).
5. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991). How-
ever, the considerable number of cases dealing with the effectiveness of forum agree-
ments undermine the Court's assessment. Instead of dealing with pretrial motions as
to whether a court has jurisdiction, courts are being constantly called upon to deter-
mine whether the jurisdiction agreement should be disregarded given the special
circumstances of the case. Carnival Cruise is an example. See David H. Taylor, The
Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 785 n.3 (1993)
(in light of the amount of litigation considering the enforcement of forum agree-
ments, the goal of reducing litigation costs and reserving judicial resources is illuso-
ry).
6. Ingrid M. Farquharson, Choice of Forum Clauses-A Brief Survey of Anglo-
American Law, 8 INT'L L. 83, 100 (1974).
7. Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363.
8. See generally Willis L. M. Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the
United States, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 187 (1964); Kurt N. Nadelmann, Choice of Court
Clauses in the United States: The Road to Zapata, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 124 (1973);
William E. Syke, Comment, Agreement in Advance Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction
on Foreign Courts, 10 LA. L. REv. 293 (1950).
9. The American case widely cited as the first to invalidate forum
agreements as against public policy was Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Ins. Co., 72 Mass.
(6 Gray) 174 (1856). The forum selection clause in Nute was contained in an insur-
ance policy and provided: "[T]he assured may ... bring an action at law against
the company [the insurer] for the loss claimed, which action shall be brought at a
proper court in the county of Essex [Massachusetts]." The action brought by the
insured was initiated, however, in a Suffolk County court. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts gave two closely related reasons for its ruling. First, the
court explained, a stipulation specifying a court in which an action is to be com-
menced is one of "remedy." Therefore, the court concluded, a matter of remedy "does
not depend on contract," rather, it is a matter "created and regulated by law." Nute,
72 Mass. (6 Gray) at 180-81. This reasoning was buttressed by "considerations of
public policy." Id. at 184. In this context, the court noticed that in determining
where actions may be brought, the legislature must have already taken into consid-
eration notions of "general convenience and expediency." Id. If litigants, by agree-
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clause intended to "oust" courts of their lawfully conferred ju-
risdiction."0 In some instances, however, courts were motivated
by practical concerns when they invalidated forum clauses."
In 1972, the Supreme Court took an important step toward
the validation of forum selection clauses in The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co." In The Bremen, an all-embracing atti-
tude of mistrust to choice-of-forum agreements was replaced by
one favoring party autonomy regarding the means of dispute
resolution. 3 In the course of its decision, the Court stated that
"[t]he argument that such clauses are improper because they
tend to 'oust' a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a vesti-
ment, were able to alter the legislature's jurisdictional scheme, "the symmetry of the
law" would be disturbed. Id
Other courts followed this reasoning and held forum selection clauses void
for infringing legislative powers to regulate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Carbon Black Ex-
port, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359
U.S. 180, reh'g denied, 359 U.S. 999 (1959); Matt v. Iowa Mut. Aid Ass'n, 46 N.W.
857 (Iowa 1890); Benson v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 66 N.E. 627 (N.Y. 1903);
Gaither v. Charlotte Motor Car Co., 109 S.E. 362 (N.C. 1921); Healy v. Eastern
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 17 Pa. Super. 385 (1901); International Traveler's Ass'n v.
Branum, 212 S.W. 630 (Tex. 1919); Savage v. People's Bldg., Loan & Say. Ass'n, 31
S.E. 991 (W. Va. 1898); Cf Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451
(1874) (a citizen "cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an agreement, which
may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occa-
sions, whenever the case may be presented."); Meacham v. Jamestown E&L R.R.,
105 N.E. 653, 656 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J., concurring) ("The jurisdiction of our
courts is established by law, and is not to be diminished, any more than it is to be
increased, by the convention of the parties.").
But see Daley v. People's Bldg., Loan & Sav. Ass'n, 59 N.E. 452, 453 (Mass.
1901) (enforcing a forum agreement in a shareholder certificate designating another
state court because when entering the agreement, the parties were standing in an
equal position and neither had an oppressive advantage or power); Greve v. Aetna
Live-Stock Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.S. 668, 669, 670 (Sup. Ct. 1894) (a forum clause desig-
nating another court in the same state is not manifestly against public policy).
10. See R. D. Hursh, Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting
Place of Court in Which Action May be Brought, 56 A.L.R.2d 300, 304 (1956).
11. See Otero v. Banco De Sonora, 225 P. 1112 (Ariz. 1924); Soliosberg v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 217 N.Y.S. 226, 229 (App. Div. 1926) (maintaining the action in
a court in the Soviet Union would bring difficulty in pleading and proof).
12. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
13. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10. See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 518 (1974) (enforcing an arbitration clause referring an American plaintiff,
and its Securities Exchange Act claim, to arbitration in France).
The Bremen was followed by considerable commentary welcoming the deci-
sion. See, e.g., Fredrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Validation of Forum-Selection
Clauses, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 49 (1972); Lawrence Collins, Choice of Forum and the
Exercise of Judicial Discretion-The Resolution of an Anglo-American Conflict, 22
IN7L & COMP. L.Q. 332 (1972); Nadelmann, supra note 8; Willis L. M. Reese, The
Supreme Court Supports Enforcement of Choice-of-Forum Clauses, 7 INT'L LAW. 530
(1973); George Delaume, Choice of Forum Clauses and the American Forum Partiae;
Something Happened on the Way to the Forum: Zapata and Silver, 4 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 295 (1973).
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gial legal fiction."' The Court characterized the problem, posed
by forum agreements, as concerning a court's discretion whether
to exercise its jurisdiction given the existence of a forum selec-
tion clause."
The Court's decision in The Bremen had significant impact on
the course taken by courts when faced with a forum agree-
ment. 6 Today, very few jurisdictions still adhere to the old rule
invalidating such clauses."
In The Bremen, the Court not only put forward strong policy
considerations in favor of enforcement of forum selection claus-
es,'" but it also managed to outline in broad terms circumstanc-
es in which a court might not enforce such clauses. The Court
deemed fraud, undue influence, overwhelming bargaining power,
and in some instances, the designation of a seriously inconve-
nient forum, to be sufficient grounds to invalidate forum selec-
tion clauses."9
14. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
15. Id.
16. Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts
After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 65
(1992) (The Bremen was generally followed in federal as well as state courts); Linda
S. Mullenex, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudica-
tory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FoRDHAm L. REV. 291, 315 (1988) (calling The
Bremen a lodestar for lower federal courts); Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva Zapata.:
Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases,
66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 422, 431 (1991) ("The Bremen sparked an overreaction, resulting
in excessive enforcement of forum selection clauses.").
However, it should be noted that some courts validated forum agreements
some time before the Court handed down its decision in The Bremen. See Central
Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966); Win. H.
Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 903 (1955), overruled by Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1967); Central Contracting Co. v. C. E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810 (Pa. 1965).
See also Willis L. M. Reese, The Model Choice of Forum Act, 17 AM. J.
COMP. L. 292 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971);
Willis L. M. Reese, A Proposed Uniform Choice of Forum Act, 5 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 193 (1966).
17. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554 (Ala. 1980);
Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 314 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1982).
18. The Court emphasized the need of tolerance, and in a sense, comity to for-
eign jurisdictions. The Court stated:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our own laws and in our courts .... We
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.
The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
19. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12, 16-17. With respect to a seriously inconve-
nient forum, the Court drew the distinction between a situation in which the parties
contemplated the alleged inconvenience at the time the agreement was negotiated
and a situation where the inconvenience is a result of circumstances which were not
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Despite the policy considerations in favor of enforcement of
forum clauses, as preached in The Bremen, and the Court's effort
to narrowly limit the exceptions to their enforcement, the Court
was not ready to put public policy to rest. A forum selection
clause would not be enforced when "enforcement would contra-
vene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is
brought."0 However, public policy did not dictate the rule.
Rather, it was perceived as an exception only to a general rule
favoring enforcement of forum selection clauses.
The purpose of this article is three-fold. First, it attempts to
define the scope of the public policy exception to the enforcement
of forum clauses. Second, the article seeks to identify the major
factors influencing the application of the exception. Third, it is
hoped that after identifying the scope of the public policy excep-
tion and the factors influencing its application, public policy, at
least in the context of forum clauses, will no longer be viewed as
elusive and vague.
II. PUBLIC POLICY AS A LEGAL DOCTRINE AND AS AN EXCEPTION
A Public Policy: General Principles
It is hard to find a legal doctrine, such as pubic policy, which
has endured extensive criticism and survived.2' The most fa-
mous and widely quoted criticism of public policy is found in the
present at the negotiation stage. Id. at 16. In the first instance, the Court
stressed: "[I]t is difficult to see why any such claim of inconvenience should be
heard." Id. In the second instance, however, it is presumed that a more tolerable
approach might be anticipated from the bench. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 345-46 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
948 (1985) (the Islamic revolution in Iran rendered litigation there seriously inconve-
nient for an American who negotiated the forum agreement before the occurrence of
the revolution).
20. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
21. See generally Arthur Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in
the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027 (1940); Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I.
Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956); Gary
J. Simson, The Public Policy Doctrine in the Choice of Law: A Reconsideration of
Older Themes, 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 391 (1974); Kent Murphy, The Traditional View
of Public Policy and Ordre Public in Private International Law, 11 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 591 (1981); PCA Snyman, Public Policy in Anglo-American Law, 19 COMP.
& INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 220 (1986); Holly Sprague, Comment, Choice of Law: A Fond
Farewell to Comity and Public Policy, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1989).
At common law, the origins of the doctrine are traced back to the fifteenth
century. See W. S. M. Knight, Public Policy in English Law, 38 L.Q. REv. 207
(1922). However, in civil law countries the doctrine only managed to emerge in the




old English case of Richardson v. Mellish," in which Judge
Burrough observed: "I protest arguing too strongly upon public
policy. It is a very unruly horse and once you get astride it, you
never know where it will carry you." 3 Similar characterizations
were heard in America. ' The apparent reason for this criti-
cism is the doctrine's vagueness, unpredictability, and uncertain-
ty in application. Nonetheless, the doctrine pushed its way into
modem doctrines' and went on to play an active role in two
major fields of law-contracts"8 and the conflict-of-laws. In
contracts, public policy has been the basis for invalidating con-
tractual provisions that were against a forum's public policy.
Rights and obligations based on gambling and prostitution
agreements, for example, were held to be invalid on public policy
grounds.28 In the conflict-of-laws context, the operation of the
doctrine is somewhat indirect. Public policy comes into play only
after the choice-of-law rules have dictated the application of
foreign law to the controversy," which according to the forum's
standards "wlould violate some fundamental principle of justice,
some prevailing conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal."30 Claims based on unreasonable
restraints of marriage3' or racially discriminating laws, for in-
stance, will not be recognized because they are against public
policy.32
22. 130 Eng. Rep. 294 (Ex. 1824).
23. Richardson, 130 Eng. Rep. at 303.
24. See, e.g., Herbert F. Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W.
VA. L.Q. 156, 170 (1930) (public policy was compared to "an elastic kind of grab bag
from which one can take out anything which he chooses to put in."); Charles B.
Nutting, Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine, 19 MINN. L. REv. 196,
200 (1935) ("We know enough to say with considerable confidence that investigation
to determine when the court will apply the doctrine of public policy to deny the rec-
ognition of a foreign right would result in the conclusion, 'you never can tell.'").
25. See John B. Corr, Modern Choice of Law and Public Policy: The Emperor
Has the Same Old Clothes, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 647, 693 (1985) ("[Plublic policy is
not likely to fade away.").
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981); ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1373-1378 (Supp. 1994).
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971); ROB-
ERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICT LAW 143-45 (4th ed. 1986).
28. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 887-89
(3d ed. 1987).
29. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 72 (2d ed.
1992); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 81 (3d ed.
1986 & Supp. 1991).
30. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918).
31. See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161,
169 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017
(1972).
32. See Oppenheimer v. Cattermole, 1976 App. Cas. 249, 278 (H.L.) (dictum)
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Whether applied in contracts or in the choice-of-law analysis,
a court adheres solely to the public policy of its own jurisdiction.
This fundamental aspect of the doctrine gave rise to a number of
legal rules invalidating certain foreign acts or judgments for the
reason that, in giving effect to such acts, the court would be
giving effect to a foreign jurisdiction's public policy or govern-
mental interests. The "revenue rule," according to which one
sovereign does not enforce revenue laws or judgments of another
sovereign, was founded on this legal notion.'
Another aspect of public policy worth emphasizing is the
doctrine's inconstant and evolving nature-it changes as society
and general notions of justice change. Therefore, there is no
public policy for all times and for all countries.'
B. Public Policy in the Forum Selection Context
1. In General
The impact of public policy on the interpretation of forum
selection clauses is one example of how conceptions of public
policy have changed over the years. As already noted, forum
agreements were once invalidated for the idea they purported to
advance-the desire to oust the noncontractual forum of jurisdic-
tion. At this early time, courts seldom inquired into the reason-
ableness of litigating the dispute in the contractual forum. The
concept of selecting an exclusive forum for litigation was repug-
nant to public policy.
Today, forum agreements are not considered invalid per se.
Courts have accepted the principles embodied in forum clauses.
Nonetheless, public policy dictates an exception to the enforce-
ment of forum clauses. Due to factors outside of the parties'
(expressing the view that Nazi decrees depriving absent German Jews of their na-
tionality and confiscating their property as against public policy).
33. See Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia
v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[T]o recognize the tax judgment
from a foreign nation ... would have the effect of furthering the governmental in-
terests of a foreign country, something which our courts customarily refuse to do.");
Moore v. Mitchel, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., concurring) ("To pass
upon the provision for the public order of another state is, or at any rate should be,
beyond the powers of a court."), affd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930). Cf Ban-
co Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (White, J., dissenting) ("[N]o
country has an obligation to further the governmental interests of a foreign sover-
eign.").
34. See Husserl, supra note 21, at 41; FA Straus & Co., Inc. v. Canadian
Pacific Ry. Co., 173 N.E. 564 (N.Y. 1930).
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desire and intention in forming such agreements, the clause
might be held against public policy. The consequences brought
about by a forum selection clause may violate a forum's statuto-
ry norms or offend a forum's basic notions of justice and morali-
ty. This indirect and consequential method of assessing the
applicability of public policy brings the doctrine closer to the
mode in which it operates, in the sphere of choice-of-laws. There-
fore, not only has there been a shift in the substance of public
policy, but the mode of its operation within the context of forum
agreements has also shifted from a contract orientation to a
choice-of-laws mode.
It is appropriate to take a closer look at the Supreme Court's
decision in The Bremen to better understand the manner by
which a forum selection clause may be rendered invalid as
against public policy.
2. The Public Policy Exception as Defined in The Bremen: The
Inward and Outward Modes of Operation of the Public Policy
Exception
The operative facts in The Bremen were fairly uncomplicated.
The plaintiff, Zapata, a Houston-based corporation, entered into
an agreement with the owner of The Bremen, Unterweser, a
German corporation, to tow its oil rig from Louisiana to Italy."
The rig, while being towed in international waters in the Gulf of
Mexico, was damaged as a result of a severe storm.36 Zapata
subsequently commenced an admiralty suit in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, located in Tam-
pa, alleging negligent towage and breach of contract. 7 Tampa
was the port to which the damaged rig was towed after the
storm."8
The forum selection clause in the agreement provided that
"[any dispute arising [between the parties] must be treated
before the London Court of Justice." 9 The agreement also con-
tained an exculpatory clause relieving Unterweser from liability
for damages arising to the rig during the towage.4"
The defendant moved to dismiss the action by invoking the
forum selection clause.4 The district court held the forum
35. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 2.
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id. at 3-4.
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id. at 2.
40. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 3 n.2.
41. Zapata v. MIS Bremen, 296 F. Supp. 733, 734 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aftd, 428
1016 Vol. 34:1009
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clause to be unenforceable.42 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed.'3 The Supreme Court ultimately vacated the decision
and remanded the case for further consideration. The primary
holding in The Bremen was that forum selection clauses are
"prima facie valid.""
One important issue the Court dealt with before validating
the forum clause was the precedent established in Bisso v. In-
land Waterways Corp.' In Bisso, the Court invalidated a clause
exempting a towing company from liability for its own negli-
gence as against public policy." Because the agreement in The
Bremen contained an exculpatory clause and because the Eng-
lish contractual forum was prepared to enforce exculpatory
clauses,47 Zapata urged the Court to follow Bisso and not en-
force the forum selection clause on the grounds of public poli-
cy.
48
Zapata's public policy argument was rejected by the Court.
The Court distinguished Bisso on the basis that, in Bisso, the
towage took place strictly in American waters,49 whereas in The
Bremen, the agreement was international."0 Because the agree-
ment was international in nature, Unterweser avoided the appli-
cation of Bisso and the public policy against exculpatory claus-
es.51 Hence, the intensity of the relationship between the Unit-
ed States and the controversy proved to be a pivotal factor in as-
sessing the application of American public policy on exculpatory
clauses.
The presumption in favor of enforcement of forum selection
clauses, as announced in The Bremen, however, was not abso-
F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), affd on reh'g, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 404
U.S. 937 (1971), vacated, 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
42. Zapata, 296 F. Supp. at 736. The district court even enjoined Unterweser
from proceeding with any further litigation before the contractual forum. Id.
43. Zapata v. M/S Bremen, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), affd, 446 F.2d 907
(5th Cir.), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 937 (1971), vacated, 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The court
relied primarily on Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297
(5th Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 809 (1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180, reh'g
denied, 359 U.S. 999 (1959).
44. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
45. 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
46. Bisso, 349 U.S. at 90. See also Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing
& Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697, 698 (1963) (per curium).
47. An undisputed affidavit of a British solicitor stated that the exculpatory
clause would be held prima facie valid by an English court. The Bremen, 407 U.S.
at 8 n.8.
48. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
49. Id. at 15-16.
50. Id. at 16.
51. Justice Douglas dissented from the majority's opinion on this point. The
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 23-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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lute.52 The Court noted that public policy was one of the excep-
tions set by the Court to the enforcement of forum clauses."
In articulating the public policy exception, the Court envi-
sioned two scenarios. The first scenario concerned the Court's
1949 decision in Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co.,'
which presented an example of "[a] contractual choice-of-forum
clause held unenforceable [because] enforcement would contra-
vene a strong public policy of the forum."55 In Boyd, the Court
was faced with the issue of whether a forum agreement entered
into between an injured employee and his employer was void
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA").' The
Court answered in the affirmative.57
The invalidation mode, applied in Boyd, can be considered a
function of "statutory preemption"58 because the statute'9 em-
bodied a public policy proscribing the enforceability of the forum
agreements."0 The Supreme Court, in Boyd, held that the forum
selection clause in the agreement was void under FELA.6' This
outcome was required by the express terms of FELA: "[A]ny
contract ... the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable
any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created
by this chapter shall to that extent be void.""2 Many courts,
lead by Boyd, determined that the venue provision of FELA is
an inherent part of an employer's liability." According to this
case law, an attempt to limit venue is void as an attempt to
exempt the carrier from liability.
A public policy analysis, in the statutory preemption mode,
looks inward. Analysis looks at the municipal laws of the forum
52. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
53. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
54. 338 U.S. 263 (1949).
55. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
56. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
57. Boyd, 338 U.S. at 265.
58. Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of
Procedure, 25 CORNELL IN7'L L.J. 51, 85 (1992).
59. The venue provision of FELA provides that an action may be brought in
any one of three designated fora. The action may be brought in the United States
district court or state courts sitting in the district of the residence of the defendant,
or in the forum in which the cause of action arose, or in the forum where the de-
fendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing the action. 45 U.S.C.
§ 56.
60. 45 U.S.C. § 56.
61. Boyd, 338 U.S. at 264-65.
62. 45 U.S.C. § 55.
63. See Boyd, 338 U.S. at 265; Akerly v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 168 F.2d
812 (6th Cir. 1948); Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert.




to determine whether the law militates against relegating the
parties to another forum. The law of the designated forum is not
relevant to this assessment.
In the Court's second scenario, the law of the contractual
forum is relevant to the public policy inquiry. In this regard, the
Court envisioned "a remote forum [which will] apply differing
foreign law to an essentially American controversy."" The
Court suggested that a failure to invalidate a forum selection
clause may contravene an important public policy of the forum
in which the suit is brought.a
In the second scenario, the public policy exception looks out-
ward. Analysis scrutinizes the foreign law that may apply to the
controversy. To apply the public policy exception, as articulated
by the Court, requires a process of comparison between the law
applicable in the forum and that applicable in the contracted
forum. The second method, in which public policy operates to
invalidate a forum selection clause, can be referred to as the
"choice-of-law mode."
The outward focus mode of operation of the public policy ex-
ception is best exemplified by Quick Erectors, Inc. v. Seattle
Bronze Corp." In Quick Erectors, the plaintiff, in spite of a fo-
rum selection clause designating the Supreme Court of New
York as the exclusive forum in which actions against the defen-
dant were to be brought, filed suit in a Missouri state court.67
Subsequently, the action was removed to federal district court in
Missouri on diversity grounds.' In the agreement, the parties
also provided for a contractual period of limitation of one year.
Under New York law, parties may agree on a period of limita-
tion shorter than the regular statutory period. 9 Under Missou-
ri law, however, parties to a contract may not limit the statute
of limitations.70 It was clear that if the forum selection clause
was enforced, thus obliging the plaintiff to sue in New York, his
action would have been time-barred because more than one year
had passed from the time his cause of action accrued.7' This
prospective outcome prompted the court to invalidate the forum
64. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17.
65. Id
66. 524 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
67. Quick Erectors, 524 F. Supp. at 352-55.
68. Id at 353.
69. Id at 356-57.




selection clause. 2 The court reasoned:
Because the forum state has decided as a matter of public policy that it
would be unreasonable or unjust for one of its citizens to be prevented
from having his day in court by virtue of a contractually shortened period
of limitation, this Court, in this instance, finds that it should not enforce
the forum selection clause. Plaintiff has prevailed in its argument that
this case falls within the public policy exception to the general rule of
enforceability of forum selection clauses which the Supreme Court carved
out in M/S Bremen."
It is evident from the court's decision that had New York law
not permitted a contractually shortened period of limitation, the
court would have relegated the parties to litigate in New York.
Therefore, the applicable law in the designated forum proved to
be a decisive factor.
In sum, it is apparent that the public policy exception to the
enforcement of forum selection clauses operates in two different
modes. The first mode of statutory preemption focuses inward to
the municipal law of the forum. The second, the choice-of-law
mode, looks outward to the law of the designated forum.
The categorization of the exception into two modes of operation
suggests that when viewed through its narrow operation in a
well-defined context, such as forum selection clauses, the public
policy doctrine seems less elusive. Therefore, if analysis can iden-
tify case patterns and factors influencing the application of public
policy within the context of forum agreements, the doctrine will
be more easily understood and workable.
III. THE EXCLUSIVENESS OF THE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE
To find a pattern in the workings of the public policy exception
to confine the doctrine, inquiry must first determine the kinds of
forum selection-clauses to which the exception applies.
Courts have long recognized two kinds of forum selection claus-
es: exclusive and nonexclusive.74 In an exclusive forum selection
clause, the parties desire to limit litigation among themselves to
a specific forum.75 In a nonexclusive forum selection clause, the
72. Quick Erectors, 524 F. Supp. at 357.
73. Id
74. GARY BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS, COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 224 (2d ed. 1992).
75. A typical exclusive choice-of-forum clause reads:
It is agreed by and between the parties that all disputes and matters whatso-
ever arising under, in connection with or incident to this contract shall be liti-
gated, if at all, in and before a court located in [name of country, state or
city], to the exclusion of the courts of any other state or country.
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parties intended to secure a designated forum to adjudicate fu-
ture controversies without excluding other forums.78
A nonexclusive forum selection clause, referred to as a "proro-
gation" clause,77  did not arouse much controversy until
recently.7" Courts regarded the parties' submission to its juris-
diction as sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction despite the
fact that, absent the prorogation clause, the court would lack
such jurisdiction.7" When courts considered exclusive forum selec-
tion clauses, referred to as "derogation" clauses,' they had diffi-
culty enforcing the clauses because in the usual setting, the court
was asked not to exercise its jurisdiction in favor of the designat-
ed court."1
It is not always an easy task determining whether a forum
selection clause is exclusive or nonexclusive. If the language of
the clause leaves no doubt as to its exclusiveness,82 a court will
ordinarily categorize the clause in accordance with its wording'
and in accordance with the parties' intent as evinced by sur-
rounding circumstances." When less obvious language is used,
however, courts seem reluctant to find a clause exclusive." For
Cf Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 588-89 (1991).
76. A nonexclusive forum selection clause could read: "[Tihe parties submit to
the jurisdiction of the court/s of [name of country, state or city]." Cf Keaty v.
Freeport Indonesia, Inc., 503 F.2d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
77. See, e.g., ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 29, at 361; BORN & WESTIN, supra
note 74, at 224.
78. See Taylor, supra note 5 (prorogation clauses contradict personal jurisdic-
tion theory); Solimine, supra note 58, at 64-69 (the doctrine permitting waiving ju-
risdictional rights through a forum selection clause too quickly abandoned the per-
sonal jurisdiction theory).
79. See D. H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Swarb v.
Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 1049 (1972); National Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964). See also Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection
Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.
133, 192-98 (1982); Juenger, supra note 13, at 51.
80. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 29, at 361.
81. Gruson, supra note 79, at 136-37. It should be added that a derogation
clause has a prorogation effect as well vis-a-vis the contractual forum. If the action
is brought in the designated forum in accordance with the exclusive forum selection
clause, the clause can confer personal jurisdiction if such a jurisdiction is lacking. In
this respect, Gruson has noted: "[An exclusive forum selection clause is a Janus-
headed clause: on the one side it is a submission to the jurisdiction of the contractu-
al forum . . . and on the other side it is an exclusion or ouster of all other jurisdic-
tions." Id. at 136 (footnote omitted).
82. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
83. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 74, at 225. See also Gruson, supra note 79,
at 134 (the exclusiveness of the clause is a matter of contract interpretation).
84. Gilbert, supra note 2, at 7.
85. BoRN & WESTIN, supra note 74, at 222. But see Borchers, supra note 16,
at 82 (when the exclusiveness of a forum clause is unclear, courts have a mild pref-
erence for interpreting the clause to be of an exclusive nature).
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example, the Second Circuit has recently determined that the
following clause was nonexclusive: "Any dispute arising between
the parties thereunder shall come within the jurisdiction of the
competent Greek Courts, specifically of the Thessaloniki
Courts."86  In both operation modes of the exception-the statu-
tory preemption mode and the choice-of-law mode-the underly-
ing setting is that of an exclusive forum selection clause which is
being considered by a noncontractual forum. It is only in this
situation that the public policy exception in its dual operation
mode becomes relevant, at least as far as The Bremen is con-
cerned. This assertion becomes more evident after considering
and dismissing the following three potential settings in which a
court considers the enforcement of a forum selection clause. The
three settings are:
(a) a noncontractual forum considering the enforcement of a
nonexclusive forum selection clause;
(b) a contractual forum considering enforcement of a
nonexclusive forum selection clause;
(c) a contractual forum considering enforcement of an exclusive
forum selection clause.
In setting (a), the forum selection clause merely confers juris-
diction on another court without jeopardizing litigation in the
noncontractual forum. s7 Because such a forum is not precluded
from adjudicating the parties' dispute, it has, in most cases, only
to establish personal and subject matter jurisdiction in order to
proceed to judgment. In this situation, the jurisdiction of the
noncontractual forum is not jeopardized by the forum clause and
there is no need to call upon public policy to invalidate it. The
86. John Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits v. Attiki Imports, 22 F.3d 51, 52-53
(2d Cir. 1994). Likewise, other courts have also held a clause with similar wording
to be nonexclusive. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758
F.2d 341 (8th Cir.) ("Any difference ... should be settled through Iranian courts."),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985); International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Orna-
mental Iron Workers v. Koski Constr. Co., 474 F. Supp. 370, 371 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
(-The parties to this contract hereby agree that the proper venue for the institution
of any action, legal or equitable, for violations of any provision of this Agreement
shall be in Erie County, Pennsylvania."); First Natl City Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F.
Supp. 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("The Supreme Court of the State of New York with-
in any county of the City of New York shall have jurisdiction of any dispute.").
87. Gruson describes the options presented by a nonexclusive forum selection
clause as follows:
In [this] case . . .plaintiff could bring an action in any forum that has per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant and subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims in dispute, but if the plaintiff wishes to commence the action in the
contractual forum he is assured by virtue of the defendant's consent to juris-
diction of in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.
Gruson, supra note 79, at 193 (footnote omitted).
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court can adjudicate the dispute notwithstanding the forum
clause.
In settings (b) and (c), where the action is brought in the con-
tractual forum, public policy as an exception is precluded from
playing an effective role. In both modes of operation, the public
policy exception is intended to keep litigation in the forum, not-
withstanding the forum selection clause. " In the settings of (b)
and (c), however, the action is brought in the contractual forum
in conformity with the clause. Therefore, the public policy excep-
tion, as envisioned by The Bremen, serves no real purpose in the
settings of (b) or (c).
Theoretically, an argument could be made that even when the
action is brought in the contractual forum (settings (b) and (c)),
public policy in its dual operation mode could still play a role.
For example, after bringing the action in the contractual forum,
the defendant could move for dismissal on the ground of forum
non conveniens5 Or, if the action was brought in a federal dis-
trict court and the transferee court is a federal district court
sitting in another district, the defendant may move for transfer
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)." In response to these tactics, the
plaintiff can argue that the forum's public policy demands that
the action not be dismissed or transferred because the public
policy of the forum requires that the forum proceed to judgment.
This argument can be based on the reasoning that the relevant
law of the other forum is repugnant to the forum's public policy
(the choice-of-law mode) or because the forum's law requires,
without regard to the foreign applicable law, that the action be
tried in the forum (the statutory preemption mode).
Even though one could imagine such an argument between
litigants, the situation is more theoretical than realistic. It
should be noted that when the contractual court is asked to reject
a § 1404(a) transfer, or a forum non conveniens dismissal re-
quest, because public policy requires the forum to handle the
action, in essence, the court is not asked to invalidate the forum
clause on public policy grounds. To the contrary, the court is
asked to validate the clause on public policy grounds. In this
situation, The Bremen's public policy exception analysis is not
involved.
Such a formalistic answer does not take public policy out of the
88. See supra Section II.B.2.
89. Gruson, supra note 79, at 137.
90. Id. Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
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forum selection clause context, much less make the invocation of
public policy theoretical. However, public policy plays no role
when an action is brought in the contractual forum because the
plaintiff need not reach the stage of invoking public policy. When
a plaintiff attempts to keep the litigation in the contractual fo-
rum, the plaintiff has a much stronger argument than one based
on public policy; why should the court allow a defendant who has
agreed to the forum's jurisdiction not be held to its agreement? Is
the inconvenience of the defendant worthy of consideration when
the defendant agreed to litigate in the contractual forum? The
Supreme Court in The Bremen answered this question stating:
[Wihere it can be said with reasonable assurance that at the time they
entered the contract, the parties to a freely negotiated private interna-
tional agreement contemplated the claimed inconvenience, it is difficult
to see why any such claim of inconvenience should be heard to render the
forum clause unenforceable. 9'
This view seems to have been generally accepted by courts,"
thus making the assertion of public policy to keep a suit in the
contractual forum a matter of theory only.
It is thus apparent that when public policy is asserted against
enforcement of a forum selection clause two conditions must be
met: the clause is exclusive and the forum in which action is
commenced is not the designated forum. Only in this setting will
public policy play a role in exempting the forum selection clause
from enforcement.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING OF THE AGREEMENT
The international or domestic orientation of the agreement
further confines the public policy exception to the enforcement of
forum selection clauses.
Courts have frequently emphasized the international setting of
the relationship between the parties when declining to employ
the public policy exception to the enforcement of a forum selec-
tion clause.93 A similar emphasis is made when a court is asked
91. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 16.
92. Northwestern Natl Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990)
("[Olne who has agreed to be sued in the forum selected by the plaintiff has thereby
agreed not to seek to retract his agreement by asking for a change of venue on the
basis of costs or inconvenience to himself."); United Mortgage Corp. v. Plaza Mort-
gage Corp., 853 F. Supp. 311, 315 (D. Minn. 1994) ("Because [the defendant] ex-
pressly consented to the choice of Minnesota as a forum the court has little sympa-
thy for [the defendant's] claims of inconvenience in defending suit in Minnesota.").
93. See Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v.
Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 385
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to enforce an arbitration clause in favor of a foreign arbitrator.94
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc."
the Supreme Court, in justifying its enforcement of an arbitration
clause requiring the parties, among them an American, to arbi-
trate an antitrust action before a Japanese panel, observed:
[C]oncerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign
and international tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the interna-
tional commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes
require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a
contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context."
The distinction drawn by the Court in Mitsubishi between a
domestic and an international setting derived from the Court's
decision in The Bremen. As indicated earlier, in The Bremen the
Court employed a test measuring the intensity of the relationship
between the parties and the controversy to the forum in order to
determine whether to apply the Bisso principle. Therefore, in The
Bremen, after the Court observed that the agreement containing
the forum selection clause was international in nature, it drew
back American public policy on exculpatory clauses and, thereby,
limited the Bisso holding invalidating exculpatory clauses to do-
mestic cases.97
It is no coincidence that the Court chose this approach. It is
often stated that a strong connection between the forum and the
controversy is needed in order to justify the application of the
forum's public policy." As the relationship between the forum
and the controversy grows weaker, the forum typically will be
less compelled to apply its public policy. Professor Nussbaum
refers to this phenomena as embodying the "relativity principle"
in the application of the public policy doctrine. One can also
(1993); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 956-58 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992); Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-
Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 915 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989);
Carbide BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motorn Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 821 F. Supp.
802, 819 (D.P.R. 1993), vacated, 19 F.3d 745 (lst Cir. 1994); Medoil Corp. v. Citi-
corp, 729 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
94. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483
U.S. 1056 (1987); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, rehg denied, 419 U.S.
885 (1974).
95. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
96. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
97. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15-16.
98. See Murphy, supra note 21, at 610; Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 21, at
981.
99. Nussbaum, supra note 21, at 1031.
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refer to this principle as the "intensity of relationship" test."
Therefore, when the Court in The Bremen spoke about a remote
forum applying foreign law to an "essentially American contro-
versy," it was in essence referring to the relativity principle.
In practice, when courts are asked to employ their public policy
for the purposes of invalidating the forum selection clause, the
orientation of the relationship between the litigants, whether
domestic or international, plays a central role in accepting or
rejecting the invocation of public policy.
The Third Circuit's decision in Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro
ed Altri-Gestione"'. exemplifies how an internationally dominat-
ed relationship manages to block public policy from invalidating
a forum selection clause. In Hodes, an American couple, Mr. and
Mrs. Hodes, initiated an action in the United States after sailing
on the Achille Lauro, an Italian-flag vessel, on a cruise in the
Mediterranean Sea which began in Genoa, Italy, and was sup-
posed to end there eleven days later."2 During the cruise the
Achille Lauro was hijacked by terrorists and an American citizen
was killed by the hijackers."3 Although the Hodeses asserted a
number of claims against the defendants,"' in essence they as-
serted that they were not provided with adequate security during
the cruise.0" The Hodeses ultimately sought damages in the
amount of $26,500,000 in total.' 6
The court found that the tickets for the cruise were sold world-
wide and that approximately ten percent of the advertising bud-
get of the joint venture operating the Achille Lauro was allocated
to the United States and Canada."7 The court also observed
that, at the time the cruise departed, only 72 of 728 passengers
were American citizens."8 The cruise tickets purchased by the
Hodes contained a forum clause designating Naples, Italy, with
exclusive jurisdiction and provided a choice-of-law clause apply-
100. Both terms are, hereinafter, used interchangeably.
101. 858 F.2d 905, 915 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989).
102. Hodes, 858 F.2d at 906.
103. Id.
104. The Hodeses claimed negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
breach of the maritime law obligation to provide safe passage and breach of contract
and implied warranties. Hodes, 858 F.2d at 907.
105. Hodes, 858 F.2d at 907.
106. The total amount of the Hodeses' action was composed of the following
sums: $5,000,000 to compensate Mrs. Hodes; $1,500,000 to compensate Mr. Hodes
(the difference probably attributed to the fact the Mr. Hodes was not on the ship at
the time of the hijacking but had disembarked to tour Egypt) and $10,000,000 for
each as punitive damages. Hodes, 858 U.S. at 907.




ing Italian law to all contractual disputes."® The Hodeses ar-
gued vigorously against enforcement of the forum selection clause
on the grounds of public policy, due to the harsh consequences
that would result if they were forced to litigate the claim in Ita-
ly."0 Under Italian law, the carrier might be exempted from lia-
bility, and, if not, would only be liable for a ceiling sum of
$10,000.111
The Third Circuit rejected the Hodeses' public policy argu-
ments and "adamantly refuse[d] to wield the trump of American
public policy."" The court went on to rule that "American pas-
sengers simply do not carry American public policy on their backs
wheresoever they may venture.""' Because most of the defen-
dants, the ship, the applicable law and the course of the cruise
were all closely connected to Italy, the court naturally decided to
"leave it for Italian courts to allocate the liabilities of this Italian
dispute.""'
The Third Circuit's holding in Hodes supports the assertion
that the international setting of the agreement is an important
factor in assessing whether to apply American public policy. In
Hodes, the court even disregarded the parties' abstention from
putting forward an expert opinion on Italian law and did not
question whether such law would enforce the ceiling amount or
absolve the carrier from liability completely."' Irrespective of
whether Italian law precluded compensation or limited it to a
ceiling, the Hodeses' $26.5 million suit still had to be adjudicated
in Italy according to the forum selection clause.
The Bremen supports the position of the Third Circuit. Accord-
ing to The Bremen Court, when articulating the choice-of-law
mode of the public policy exception, the mode relevant in
Hodes,"' it spoke of a "foreign forum" applying "differing for-
109. Id.
110. Id. at 912-16.
111. Id. at 915.
112. Hodes, 858 F.2d at 915.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 913.
116. The Third Circuit in Hodes resorted to the statutory preemptive mode but
to no avail. The Hodeses' first public policy argument relied on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA7), 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1988). Hodes, 858 F.2d
at 914. They asserted that COGSA invalidates the forum clause because the clause
necessarily lessens the carrier's liability, and is therefore against the express lan-
guage of COGSA. Id. However, the court found COGSA inapplicable to the Hodeses'
claims because the enactment was limited to voyages that touch the United States
and the Hodeses' voyage did not. Id. As to the ramifications of COGSA on forum
clauses, see discussion supra Section VA. 1-2.
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eign law to an essentially American controversy."" 7 If the con-
troversy is essentially not American, but foreign, then analysis
disregards American public policy." 8 Therefore, when the con-
troversy in Hodes was characterized as being an "Italian dis-
pute"" and not being "essentially American," the court felt no
compulsion to invoke American public policy. 2'
The intensity of relationship test is so fundamental to the
determination to apply public policy to a forum clause dispute
that even in the "bad old days" when the clause was deemed to
be inherently against public policy, a court faced with a truly
international agreement enforced a forum selection clause con-
tained in the agreement. Such was the case in Mittenthal v.
Mascagni."' The defendant, Mascagni, who was an Italian com-
poser, signed a contract with the plaintiffs, who were citizens of
New York, in which he undertook to direct certain concerts and
operas during a fifteen-week tour through the United States and
Canada.' The contract was written in Italian and signed in
Florence, Italy." It is important to note that the plaintiffs had
contractually elected Italy to be their domicile." 4 Furthermore,
the contract contained a choice-of-law clause applying Italian law
and providing that the civil authorities of Florence, Italy, shall
adjudicate disputes between the parties.
125
It is not clear from the court's decision why the action was
brought against Mascagni. Moreover, the court did not state why
Mascagni was sued in a Massachusetts state court. Apparently,
Mascagni defaulted and was hailed into court in Massachusetts,
where he happened to be present after default.
Relying on the forum selection clause, Mascagni moved to
dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction and the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts ultimately enforced the clause."'
After stressing the substantial contacts the case had with Italy
117. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17.
118. In The Bremen, the agreement had an exculpatory clause which, if present
in a domestic voyage, would have been held invalid according to the Bisso decision.
However, because the agreement was characterized as international and despite the
fact that the exculpatory clause would be enforceable under English law, thereby
relieving the carrier of liability, the Court enforced the forum clause. The Bremen,
407 U.S. at 17-20.
119. Hodes, 858 F.2d at 915.
120. Id.
121. 66 N.E. 425 (Mass. 1903).




126. Id. at 425-27.
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and noting that the contract was also to be partly performed
there, 127 the court found that there was nothing so objectionable
in the present forum selection clause on the grounds of public
policy. 128 The court also explained that "[t]he contract was be-
tween citizens of foreign states who, so far as our tribunals are
concerned.., might take any reasonable arrangement for the
settlement of their disputes."'2 The forum clause was reason-
able because it purported to eliminate the possibility of litigation
arising in the numerous jurisdictions to which the contract was
connected.'
Over a decade later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts in Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co.,"a
made it clear that it still adhered to the "ouster" theory and ab-
stained from overruling Mittenthal.3 2 Nonetheless, the court in
Nashua distinguished the cases asserting that, in Mittenthal, the
parties were aliens, and the relationship was that "of hurried
travel through many jurisdictions. " "
It should also be noted that the court in Mittenthal arrived at
its conclusion without inquiring into the prospective outcome of
the controversy under Italian law. The court seemed concerned
only with whether the forum clause was enforceable under Ital-
ian law."M On the other hand, when a controversy had signifi-
cant contacts with the United States, thus scoring high on the
intensity of relationship test, but yet was not "essentially Ameri-
can," courts did inquire into the nature of the law applicable in
the designated forum. Such was the case in Roby v. Corporation
of Lloyd's." In Roby, over one hundred American citizens and
residents who invested in Lloyd's syndicates filed suit alleging
that they had suffered financial losses as a result of the
defendants' violations of the Securities Acts of 193336 and
1934 's and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act ("RICO").
3 8
Lloyd's operation was thoroughly reviewed by the court.'38
127. Mittenthal, 66 N.E. at 426.
128. id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 426-27.
131. 111 N.E. 678 (Mass. 1916).
132. Nashua, 111 N.E. at 681.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 385 (1993).
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988).
137. Id. §§ 78a-7811.
138. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
139. Roby, 996 F.2d at 1357-58.
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Most of the plaintiffs in Roby were actively solicited in the Unit-
ed States by Lloyd's representatives4 but each was contractu-
ally obligated to litigate a dispute in England."'
The Second Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court's
order dismissing the actions for improper venue based on the
obligation to litigate in England." However, in doing so the
court was seriously concerned with the anticipated outcome of
litigation in England.
First, the court took notice of the fact that the securities laws
were aimed at protecting American investors by requiring a high
standard of disclosure." Furthermore, by including anti-waiver
provisions in the securities laws, Congress intended to prevent
the thwarting of American public policy as incorporated in the
securities laws.'" The court concluded that the public policy of
the securities laws would be contravened if the application of
foreign law inadequately deterred issuers from exploiting Ameri-
can investors."
However, English law, as ascertained by the court, was found
to embody several adequate remedies available to vindicate the
substantive rights of the American investors and was found to
provide sufficient deterrence against exploitation." Therefore,
public policy did not invalidate the forum selection clause." 7
Furthermore, in its Roby decision, the Second Circuit stated
that it disagreed with the Tenth Circuit decision in Riley v.
Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd.,"4 on the ground that the
Tenth Circuit ignored the substantive law applicable in the desig-
nated forum." In discussing a forum selection clause and a
choice-of-law clause, with respect to claims similar to those dis-
cussed in Roby, the Tenth Circuit noted: "When an agreement is
truly international, as here, and reflects numerous contacts with
the foreign forum, the Supreme Court has quite clearly held that
the parties' choice of law and forum selection provisions will be
given effect."'
Such wording by the Tenth Circuit could lead to the conclu-
140. Id. at 1365.
141. Id. at 1357-58.
142. Id. at 1366.
143. Id. at 1364.
144. Roby, 996 F.2d at 1364.
145. Id. at 1364-65.
146. Id. at 1365-66.
147. Id. at 1366.
148. 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992).
149. Roby, 996 F.2d at 1362-63.
150. Riley, 969 F.2d at 957.
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sion, as arrived at by the Second Circuit in Roby, that the sub-
stance of the foreign law will not be relevant to the enforcement
of a forum selection clause in an action brought by an American
investor based on the securities laws. Nonetheless, the Riley and
Roby decisions, in essence, did not take opposing positions. The
intensity of the relationship between the United States and the
respective transactions was not the same in both cases.
In Riley, the Tenth Circuit spoke about a "truly international"
agreement, whereas the agreement in Roby did not qualify as
such. In Roby, the Second Circuit went out of its way to empha-
size the fact that it was dealing with the claims of hundreds of
American investors who were "actively solicited in the United
States by Lloyd's representatives."15" ' On the other hand, in
Riley, the action was brought by a lone American investor who
"traveled to England on several occasions to pursue his quest" in
investing with Lloyd's."2 It is, therefore, clear that the interna-
tional setting in the cases is not the same.
It would certainly seem odd if the Second Circuit had invali-
dated the forum selection clause for the sole reason that an in-
vestor happened to be an American while all of the other parties
and other aspects of the relationship were closely connected to a
foreign jurisdiction which also happened to be the place where
the parties contractually agreed to litigate. If, in such a case, the
Second Circuit had held that American public policy was suffi-
ciently infringed, because the foreign forum did not afford an
adequate remedy, the "provincial attitude" of which The Bremen
warned would appear."s It may be added that, in The Bremen,
it was quite apparent to the Court that, if relegated to the for-
eign contractual forum, the American party would have had a
very slim chance of recovering damages due the exculpatory
clause in the agreement."5
Therefore, when the contacts with the noncontractual Ameri-
can forum are so attenuated, as was the case in Riley, it is not
surprising that the court ignored the applicable law in the con-
tractual forum. However, when such contacts were much stronger
in Roby, the court was concerned about the outcome of the case if
litigated in England. Having scored differently on the intensity of
relationship test, both cases cannot therefore be equated. The
contrast between Riley and Roby demonstrates how the intensity
of relationship test is a vital tool in assessing the application of
151. Roby, 996 F.2d at 1365.
152. Riley, 969 F.2d at 955.
153. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.




Moreover, the Second Circuit in Roby also failed to appreciate
the fact that, in Riley, the Tenth Circuit did take cognizance of
English law, which was the law made applicable by the agree-
ment. While the court did not give much weight to the outcome of
the case under English law, the Tenth Circuit reasoned: "English
law does not preclude Riley from pursuing an action for
fraud."1
55
The intensity of relationship test, which inquires into the
strength of the relationship between the controversy and the
forum, is of fundamental importance in assessing whether to
apply domestic public policy and invalidate the forum selection
clause. The more contacts the case has with the United States, or
with a particular state, the more inclined a court will be to apply
its public policy to invalidate a forum selection clause.
V. THE DUAL OPERATIONAL MODES OF THE EXCEPTION IN
DETAIL
Our endeavor to confine the public policy exception to the en-
forcement of forum selection clauses, to improve certainty and
predictability in its employment, can be carried out further if its
statutory preemption and choice-of-law modes of operation are
analyzed in more detail:
A. Statutory Preemption
The statutory preemption analysis of a forum selection clause
is essentially an inquiry into how explicit a statutory scheme
must be in order to invalidate the clause.
Basically, Congress has the constitutional authority to enact
statutes limiting the validity of forum agreements."6 However,
an express provision invalidating forum agreements has not yet
been enacted. Thus, a norm against the enforcement of forum
clauses is deduced from other statutory schemes.
The Supreme Court, in dealing with a similar inquiry, but
concerning the validity of arbitration clauses, observed: "Having
made the bargain to arbitrate the party should be held to it un-
less Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver
of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."157 Analo-
155. Riley, 969 F.2d at 958.
156. Solimine, supra note 58, at 85.




gously, in the forum selection context, a question arises: How and
where can we find the "evinced" congressional intent? Should we
focus on the text of the relevant statutory provision" or is a
broader latitude of inquiry permissible? The Court seems, at
least in the arbitration context, to prefer the latter approach. In
Shearson /American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,6 9 the Court
considered the "text, history, or purpose of the statute" to be rel-
evant to discern the intent of Congress."
Until recently, in the forum agreement context, the liberal
approach of interpretation dominated. 6 ' However, after the Su-
preme Court's decision in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute"2
an intent much more explicit than that provided by the objectives
of the legislative scheme is required in order to hold a forum
selection clause invalid through the statutory preemption mode.
To fully understand this important shift, an outline of the liberal
interpretive attitude that prevailed before Carnival Cruise is
provided.
1. Background: The Indussa Progeny
Case law dealing with the validity of forum agreements under
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA")'" adequately dem-
onstrates how the underlying policies of a statute, rather than
the literal meaning of a text, call for the invalidation of forum
clauses.
The leading case dealing with the validity of forum clauses
under COGSA is Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg.1" The plain-
tiff, Indussa, a New York corporation, was the consignee of goods
shipped from Belgium to San Francisco.' On delivery, the car-
go was found to be damaged, primarily due to rust." The dam-
age was estimated in the amount of $2,600.' The S.S.
Ranborg, the carrier of the goods, having been found in American
waters, was named defendant in an in rem action brought by
Indussa.'" The action was brought in the District Court for the
158. Cf West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v- Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
159. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
160. Shearson /American, 462 U.S. at 227. See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
161. See discussion infra Section V.A.1.
162. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
163. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1988).
164. 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
165. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 200.





Southern District of New York."9 The bills of lading drawn on
the damaged goods included a clause entitled "Jurisdiction" pre-
scribing that "[amny dispute arising under this Bill of Lading
shall be decided in the country where the carrier has his princi-
pal place of business." 7 Because the principal place of business
of Ranborg's owner was alleged to be in Norway, a motion was
entered for an order declining jurisdiction based on the forum
agreement. 7' The district court, following the Second Circuit's
decision in Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line,
Ltd.,"' declined jurisdiction in favor of the courts of
Norway.7 ' In Muller, the Second Circuit validated a forum
clause in a bill of lading drawn on goods shipped to Philadelphia,
even though the clause designated the courts of Sweden.'74 The
Muller court was influenced by the fact that foreign statutory law
corresponding to COGSA, primarily of Canada and Australia,
contained provisions that expressly held forum selection clauses
invalid, whereas COGSA did not.'75
On appeal, however, the district court's decision in Indussa
was reversed.'76 Consequently, the Muller holding was also
overruled.'77
In Indussa, the Second Circuit concluded that forum selection
clauses selecting a foreign court are inherently invalid under
COGSA."'7 First, the court pointed out that COGSA applies to
all bills of lading regarding goods carried by sea to and from the
United States.'79 Therefore, an American court is obliged to ap-
ply COGSA when a bill of lading falls within its scope."'s Be-
cause a foreign court is under no obligation to apply COGSA,
relegating the parties to that foreign court would circumvent
COGSA.'8 ' The court stated:
Although these provisions of COGSA... do not speak directly to a clause
which simply vests a foreign court with exclusive jurisdiction, giving
effect to such a clause is almost as objectionable as enforcing a clause
169. Id. at 200.
170. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 201.
171. Id.
172. 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955), overruled by
Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
173. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 200.
174. Muller, 224 F.2d at 808.
175. Id. at 807.
176. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 204.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 203.
180. Id.
181. Indussa, 224 F.2d at 203.
1034 Vol. 34:1009
1996 Forum Selection Clauses 1035
subjecting the bill of lading to foreign law since, despite hortatory efforts,
there would seem to be no way, save perhaps stipulation by the parties,
that would bind the foreign court in its choice of applicable law.12
The Second Circuit went on to consider the COGSA provisions
dealing with anti-waiver clauses."M Under COGSA, "any clause,
covenant, or agreement... relieving the carrier... for loss or
damage to or in connection with the goods.., or lessening such
liability.., shall be null and void and of no effect."' Accord-
ingly, the Second Circuit concluded that even if the foreign desig-
nated court would apply COGSA or a similar enactment,8 a
trial in this forum "might lessen [the] carrier's liability.""" The
potential for lessening liability is almost always present, the Sec-
ond Circuit explained, when a plaintiff is burdened by having to
litigate abroad.187 In light of the forum clause relegating the
parties to litigate abroad, the plaintiff might not pursue litigation
at all, thereby relieving the defendant of liability." The Second
Circuit, therefore, held, a priori, the forum agreement invalid
under COGSA. lss
The Indussa decision was severely criticized."9M Nonetheless,
despite The Bremen's preaching about the values of international
commerce, commentators,' and the majority of jurisdic-
tions' abided by the Indussa ruling. Therefore, a forum selec-
182. Id. (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 203-04.
184. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8).
185. Early in its decision, the Second Circuit noted that Norwegian law, the
law applicable according to the bill of lading, was almost identical to COGSA.
Indussa, 377 F.2d at 201.
186. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 203.
187. Id.
188. The Second Circuit observed: "[T]o require an American plaintiff to assert
his claim only in a distant court lessens the liability of the carrier quite substantial-
ly, particularly when the claim is small. Such a clause puts 'a high hurdle' in the
way of enforcing liability." Indussa, 377 F.2d at 203 (citation omitted).
189. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 204.
190. See Stephen M. Denning, Choice of Forum Clauses in Bills of Lading, 2 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 17 (1970) (characterizing Indussa as moving in the opposite direc-
tion). See also Justin L. Williams, Forum-Selection Clauses: Where They Are-Where
They are Going, 6 Hous. J. INTL L. 1, 13-14 (1983).
191. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARrIME LAw 552 (2d ed.
1994) (characterizing the Indussa rule a practical approach). See also Charles L.
Black, Jr., The Bremen, COGSA and the Problem of Conflicting Interpretation, 6
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 365 (1973); Allan I. Mendelson, Liberalism, Choice of Forum
Clauses and the Hague Rules, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 661 (1971).
192. See Hughes Drilling Fluids v. MN Luo Fu Shan, 852 F.2d 840 (5th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989); Conklin & Garret, Ltd. v. MN Finnrose,
826 F.2d 1441 (5th Cir. 1987); Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642
F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981); C.A. Seguros Orinoco v. Na Viera Transpapel, C.A., 677 F.
Supp. 675 (D.P.R. 1988). Cf Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Puerto Rican Forward-
Duquesne Law Review
tion clause in a bill of lading that designates a foreign forum is
likely to be invalidated because it inherently contradicts
Congress' policy as contained in COGSA. 93 This is particularly
true when the bill of lading is for the carriage of goods by sea to
or from the United States.'94 When there is no such connection
with the United States, then COGSA is not applicable and it will
not restrict the enforcement of forum selection clauses.'
2. Limitations on the Indussa Principle
Two developments appear to limit the applicability of the
Indussa principle. The first is minor and the second could sub-
stantively curtail the principle.
The minor limitation results from a distinction drawn regard-
ing the source for the application of COGSA. If COGSA is found
to be applicable by its own terms, ex proprio vigore,'96 the
Indussa principal is not affected. 97 If, on the other hand,
COGSA is found to be applicable on the sole basis of being incor-
porated by a choice-of-law clause in the agreement, then the
Indussa principal may not be applicable.'98 This approach relies
on common sense. It is difficult to imagine that the parties, after
agreeing to a forum selection clause, would choose a law that
would invalidate their forum agreement. The choice of COGSA
must have been based on the assumption that it would not inval-
idate the forum clause.
This approach is consistent with that taken in response to
agreements that select a law hostile to forum selection clauses
despite the inclusion of a forum clause in the agreement. Such
was the setting in Bense v. Interstate Battery Systems of Ameri-
ca."'99 In Bense, the plaintiff objected to transferring the action
from New York to Texas in compliance with a forum selection
clause, arguing that the clause was void because Texas law, the
law selected by the agreement, held forum agreements to be
ing Co., 492 F.2d 1294 (1st Cir. 1974).
For an additional survey, see C. Andrews Waters, The Enforceability of Fo-
rum Selection Clauses in Maritime Bills of Lading: An Update, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J.
29, 40-45 (1990).
193. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d at 724-25.
194. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1300.
195. See Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 914 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989). Cf North River Ins. Co. v. Fed/Sea
Pac. Line, 647 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982).
196. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1300.
197. See Waters, supra note 192, at 38-39.
198. Id. at 39 (citations omitted).
199. 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982).
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invalid.2" The Second Circuit had little tolerance for the argu-
ment. The court, in rejecting the argument, stated: "[The
plaintiffs] interpretation would render the forum selection clause
meaningless, and would thus frustrate the purpose of the parties
as it is clearly set forth in the agreement." 0'
Therefore, it is important to scrutinize the basis for the appli-
cability of a statute prior to reaching a conclusion that it invali-
dates forum agreements. If it applies by the power of its incorpo-
ration, and not ex proprio vigore, common sense militates against
the invalidation of a forum selection clause on public policy
grounds. The fact that under regular circumstances the statute
will not tolerate forum clauses should not dictate a similar intol-
erance when the enactment is applicable by reason of the parties'
wish. It was that same wish that prescribed the inclusion of the
forum selection clause.
The major limitation on the Indussa principle is embodied in
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute.2"' A Washington state couple, Mr. and Mrs.
Shute, purchased tickets for a seven-day cruise aboard the
Tropicale, a ship owned by Carnival Cruise Lines ("Carnival"), a
corporation headquartered in Miami, Florida."3 The tickets
purchased by the Shutes contained a forum selection clause des-
ignating the courts of Florida with exclusive jurisdiction.'"°
During the cruise, and while the ship was in international wa-
ters, Mrs. Shute slipped on a deck mat and suffered personal
injuries."0 ' Upon their return home, the Shutes filed suit
against Carnival in a federal district court in Washington
claiming that Mrs. Shute's fall was a result of the negligence of
Carnival.'
Carnival moved for summary judgment, contending that the
forum agreement required bringing the action in Florida, and
alternatively, argued that the district court lacked personal juris-
diction." The district court accepted Carnival's argument con-
cerning the lack of personal jurisdiction and, thereby, granted its
motion."
200. Bense, 683 F.2d at 719-20.
201. Id. at 722. See also Lexington Inv. Co. v. Southwest Stainless, Inc., 697 F.
Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
202. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
203. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 587.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 588
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 588.
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On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed.2" The Ninth Circuit
found that the district court had personal jurisdiction. Moreover,
the court refused to enforce the forum clause because it was
contained in an agreement which was not the result of free bar-
gaining, but was a contract of adhesion.21
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a decision
which strongly favored the enforcement of forum selection claus-
es. Justice Blackmun, speaking for a 7-2 majority, stated that the
fact that the clause was in a standard form contract, and was not
freely bargained for, was in itself not sufficient to hold the clause
unenforceable.21'
Importantly, the Shuteses based their argument to invalidate
the forum clause on the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability
Act ("LVOLA)." LVOLA provides that:
It shall be unlawful for the manager, agent, master or owner of any ves-
sel transporting passengers between ports of the United States or be-
tween any such port and a foreign port to insert in any rule, regulation,
contract, or agreement any provision or limitation (1) purporting, in the
event of loss of life or bodily injury arising from negligence or fault of
such owner... to relieve such owner ... from liability ... or (2) purport-
ing in such event to lessen, weaken, or void the right of any claimant to
trial by court of competent jurisdiction .... All such provisions... are
declared to be against public policy and shall be null and void and of no
effect.
213
This provision is strikingly similar to the anti-waiver clause
found in COGSA.214 Additionally, both enactments have similar
scopes of applicability.2"' Nonetheless, the Court took a course
of statutory interpretation much more conservative than that
taken by the Second Circuit in Indussa.
The majority in Carnival Cruise took cognizance of the legisla-
tive history of LVOLA only to find that there was no express
prohibition against forum selection clauses.2 6 In the absence of
an express intent, Justice Blackmun concluded: "Because the
209. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 863 F.2d 1437, 1438 (9th Cir. 1988), modi-
fled, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
210. Shute, 863 F.2d at 1448.
211. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 593.
212. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (1988).
213. Id. app. § 183c.
214. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
215. Compare 46 U.S.C. app. § 183b(a) ("It shall be unlawful for the manag-
er . . . of any sea-going vessel . . . transporting passengers or merchandise or prop-
erty from or between ports of the United States and foreign ports to provide.") with
46 U.S.C. app. § 1300 ("Every bill of lading . . . for the carriage of goods by sea to
or from ports of the United States.").
216. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 596.
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clause before us allows for judicial resolution of claims against
petitioner and does not purport to limit petitioner's liability for
negligence, it does not violate § 183c."" 7
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, disagreed strongly
with the majority on this issue. 18 Justice Stevens noted that in
1936, when LVOLA was enacted, courts still adhered to the tra-
ditional rule which denied enforcement of forum selection claus-
es. 19 Therefore, there was no need to include an express prohi-
bition against forum agreements in LVOLA."' Secondly, quot-
ing from congressional debates, Justice Stevens concluded that
LVOLA intended to put a stop to all "practices and practices of
like character," the purpose of which was to lessen a carrier's
liability.22' Justice Stevens asserted that "[a] liberal read-
ing"22' of LVOLA prohibits the inclusion of forum selection
clauses in passenger tickets just as COGSA prohibits the inclu-
sion of such clauses in bills of lading." It is not surprising,
therefore, that Justice Stevens drew support from the Indussa
progeny."
Nonetheless, the majority stood firmly behind its holding. The
majority's reasoning suggests an approach of wide application.
Because the Court dwelled heavily on the express rather than
the implicit intent of Congress, anything short of a
straightforward prohibition cannot be considered as a prohibition
against forum selection clauses. The dissent's rationale for the
absence of an express prohibition was not sufficient for the ma-
jority. In consequence, Carnival Cruise appears to oppose the
Indussa principal. Commentators have recognized this inference
and have concluded that Indussa and its progeny are question-
able in light of Carnival Cruise."'
It can be argued that Indussa is to be spared the edge of Car-
nival Cruise on the premise that the former dealt with an inter-
217. Id. at 596-97.
218. Justice Stevens also disagreed with the majority on the issue of form con-
tracts. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 597-601 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
opined that a forum selection clause in a standardized passenger ticket is unenforce-
able. Id. at 601.
219. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 602.
220. Id. at 603-04.
221. Id. at 602-03.
222. Id. at 603.
223. Id. at 603-04.
224. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 604.
225. See Borchers, supra note 16, at 77 (Carnival Cruise has implicitly over-
ruled Indussa and its progeny); Michael F. Sturley, Case Note, Strengthening the
Presumption of Validity for Choice of Forum Clauses, 23 J. MAR. L. & COM. 131,
142-43 (1992) (after Carnival Cruise, it is difficult to justify the Indussa rationale).
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national agreement. If the Indussa court were faced with a forum
agreement designating Florida courts, instead of the courts of
Norway, the Indussa court may have enforced the clause.22 The
Second Circuit in Indussa stressed the fact that an American
tribunal would be subject "to the uniform control of the Supreme
Court."227 This, the court explained, differentiated American
from Norwegian courts. 28 Even if the latter courts were to ap-
ply an enactment similar or even identical to COGSA, there is no
guarantee that they would implement the enactment according to
American precedent.
Although this distinction might have been valid at the time, at
the present time, the prevalent view is that, in light of The Bre-
men, the international setting of the agreement tips the scale
heavily in favor of enforcing the forum selection clause.229 Addi-
tionally, because Carnival Cruise had a domestic setting, the
rationale advanced by the majority, which only strengthened the
presumption of the validity of forum clauses, should apply with
much more force in an international setting similar to that in
Indussa. In turn, this further erodes the effectiveness of the
Indussa principle.
Another side effect resulting from Carnival Cruise derives from
the fact that the case dealt with a personal injury action. As a
matter of principle, it is recognized that the interests of protect-
ing and preserving human life weigh heavily when compared
with that of protecting the economic integrity of various enti-
ties.23 Thus, in a situation where one must decide whether to
implement a certain norm aimed at protecting the physical integ-
rity of humans or one aimed at protecting economic welfare,
preference should be given to the former.231 A commentator has
suggested a similar approach when attempting to provide guide-
226. See Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., 492
F.2d 1294, 1296 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding the Indussa principle inapplicable because
the designated forum was an American court rather than a foreign court).
227. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 204.
228. Id.
229. See supra Section IV.
230. Cf David E. Seidelson, Resolving Choice-of-Law Problems Through Interest
Analysis in Personal Injury Actions: A Suggested Order of Priority Among Competing
State Interests and Among Available Techniques for Weighing Those Interests, 30
DUQ. L. REV. 869 (1992). In a choice-of-law inquiry that presents a true conflict, the
law "[pirotecting and preserving human life must be assigned greater significance
than that aimed at protecting economic integrity." Id. at 875.
231. Seidelson, supra note 230, at 875. See also David E. Seidelson, Choice-of
Law Problems in Medical Malpractice Actions: Legislative Prescriptions and Judicial
Side Effects, 28 DUQ. L. REV. 41, 86 (1989) ("[A] conduct regulating interest aimed
at protecting and preserving human life, almost by definition, appears to be of a
greater moment than a competing interest in protecting economic integrity.").
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lines for the usage of public policy. 32 In this light, the sweeping
effect of Carnival Cruise is magnified. The Indussa principle orig-
inated in an action brought for damages to goods amounting to
$2,600." The Second Circuit, however, found an implicit con-
gressional intent compelling it to overrule its prior decision in
Muller and hold forum agreements void under COGSA.2 3 On
the other hand, Carnival Cruise dealt with a personal injury
action. Considering the traditional preference given to the protec-
tion of human life, it is expected that the Court would adopt a
less tolerant approach toward forum agreements than that of
Indussa. The Shuteses were in essence asked to travel across the
country to pursue a personal injury action. The majority in Car-
nival Cruise, however, stood behind its decision. The effect of this
course on the pursuance of future personal injury actions, and
the potential that forum clauses will serve as de facto exculpato-
ry clauses to the benefit of large corporations23 5 did not figure
into the majority's analysis.
This pumps new life into the Second Circuit's earlier decision
in Muller. In Muller, the Second Circuit noted at the outset of its
decision that COGSA does not "expressly invalidate the jurisdic-
tional agreement in the bill of lading here involved."2 ' The Sec-
ond Circuit also recognized that corresponding enactments to
COGSA, in both Australia and Canada, expressly invalidated
forum agreements, while COGSA did not.237 Therefore, the
court concluded that "if Congress had intended to invalidate such
agreements, it would have done so in a forthright manner."
238
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Carnival Cruise, it
is reasonable to conclude that implicit language based on the
history and purpose of a statute is not sufficient to trigger the
public policy exception in its statutory preemption mode. A statu-
tory scheme much more explicit in its defiance to forum selection
clauses may be required.
232. Simson, supra note 21, at 408.
233. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 201.
234. Id. at 203.
235. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers,
Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REv. 423, 425 (1992)
(in Carnival Cruise, the Court failed to discuss the fact that forum clauses constitute
a powerful litigation weapon for large corporate defendants).





3. Statutorily Preemptive Special Venue Schemes
Public policy can invalidate forum selection clauses by way of
statutorily preemptive venue provisions."'
In consideration of the special legal relationship existent be-
tween parties to a contract with a forum selection clause, a num-
ber of statutes regulating such relationships involve venue provi-
sions different from general venue rules. In providing special
venue provisions in a certain enactment, it can be presumed that
the legislature intended to provide an exclusive forum which
cannot be defeated by a private agreement.
Until recently, the Miller Act 2" was indicative in this re-
gard. '4 In principle, the Miller Act grants a right of action to a
subcontractor furnishing labor or materials to the United States
whereby the subcontractor can sue in the name of the United
States on a surety bond of the general contractor.242 Such an
action, the Miller Act provides, "shall be brought.., in the Unit-
ed States District Court for any district in which the contract
was to be performed and executed and not elsewhere."2"
Initially, a majority of courts interpreted the venue provision of
the Miller Act to suggest a strong public policy against enforce-
ment of forum agreements.2 " However, it appears that the
modern trend favors a more conservative course of interpretation,
which in turn comports with the general liberal approach toward
enforcement of forum clauses. The Fifth Circuit, in In re
Fireman's Fund,2" which was strongly influenced by The Bre-
men, concluded that because venue provisions exist for the con-
venience of the parties and can be waived, "[s]uch a provision is
subject to variation by... agreement."2"
Therefore, in providing special venue provisions, a statute does
not necessarily preempt a forum selection clause which points to
another forum for litigation.24 7 This approach appears to be the
majority view today.2"
239. See Solimine, supra note 58, at 88.
240. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270d (1988).
241. See Gruson, supra note 79, at 174-75.
242. 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a).
243. Id. § 270b(b).
244. See Gruson, supra note 79, at 174-75 (citations omitted).
245. 588 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1979).
246. Fireman's Fund, 588 F.2d at 95.
247. See Solimine, supra note 58, at 88.
248. See Arrow Plumbing & Heating Co. v. American Mechanical Servs. Corp.,
810 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D.R.I. 1993). Cf United States ex rel. Capolino Sons, Inc. v.
Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 364 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 385
U.S. 924 (1966) (upholding the enforceability of arbitration clauses in subcontract
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Does this suggest a "crack" in Boyd and its progeny? FELA,
the act under consideration in Boyd, includes an anti-waiver pre-
scription. The Miller Act does not and its provisions have been
held to be subject to waiver. 49 Therefore, the Court in Boyd, in
considering FELA, had much stronger ground from which to
invalidate forum clauses than it had with the Miller Act.
Recent developments, however, suggest that even when anti-
waiver provisions are present, forum agreements may still be
spared invalidation. As indicated previously, Carnival Cruise
strongly backs this proposition."' However, in this regard, Car-
nival Cruise does not stand alone. In analyzing the anti-waiver
provisions included in the securities acts,25" ' the Supreme Court,
in the context of arbitration, has repeatedly held that "by agree-
ing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral rather than a judicial forum."" 2
Courts have followed suit and analogously applied the above
rationale to include, mutatis mutandis, forum agreements,
whether the designated court is American" or foreign.'
Finding arbitration and forum clauses, in this regard, simi-
lar,' Boyd's premise seems jeopardized. If arbitration before a
panel does not, in itself, infringe on the substantive right of liti-
agreements principally governed by the Miller Act).
249. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Youngstown Welding v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 802 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1986); Warrior Constructors, Inc. v. Harders, Inc.,
387 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir. 1967).
250. See supra notes 210-38 and accompanying text.
251. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc(a) (1988).
252. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985). See also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 481 (1989), overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
253. Friedman v. World Transp., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 685, 692 (N.D. Iml. 1986).
254. Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 161 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1057 (1994); Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir.
1993).
255. However, the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi leaned toward the proposition
that the treatment of forum agreements might be less tolerable than that of arbitra-
tion clauses. In dicta, the Court indicated that "in the event the choice-of-forum and
choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to
pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in
condemning the agreement as against public policy." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637
n.19. Earlier in its opinion, the Court also stressed the fact that international ar-
bitration owes no prior "allegiance to the legal norms of particular states." Id. at
636. This implies that the treatment of a forum clause designating a foreign court
might be different from arbitration.
However, as indicated earlier, this dicta was not followed and what proved
to be of determinant importance regarding forum agreements is the inquiry whether
the law applicable in the designated forum offers sufficient remedies vindicating the
substantive rights of the plaintiff. See infra Section V.B.
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gation, why would litigation before a foreign official tribunal?
Surely, comity and respect for international commercial activity
do not support such a result.
The trend is clearly in favor of the conservative interpretation
given in Carnival Cruise, thereby reinforcing the validity of fo-
rum selection clauses. Courts, in light of the general policy favor-
ing enforcement of forum agreements, tend to concentrate on the
explicit language of the enactment."' The possibility of defying
the underlying purposes of a statutory scheme is countered by
the general policy favoring enforcement of clauses providing
means of dispute resolution between the parties.257
This analysis not only comports with the recent decisions ren-
dered by the Supreme Court, but also with a logical notion re-
garding public policy in general. If, in fact, a forum agreement is
against public policy the legislature could provide a straightfor-
ward statement concerning the ineffectiveness of such clauses.
This is particularly true in light of the anti-waiver provisions
present in different statutes. These provisions attest to the fact
that when the legislature has a special need to invalidate certain
kinds of common contractual stipulations hindering the policies
of a legislative scheme, it expressly does so.
Even if the particular statute was enacted when the dominat-
ing view was against forum clauses,2" over two decades have
passed since The Bremen was decided. Meanwhile, Congress and
other state legislatures have not expressly declared policy on the
subject. The absence of such a declaration only strengthens the
basic proposition that more explicit language is needed in order
to find forum agreements invalid under a certain act.
256. See Weiss v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1276, 1281-
82 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Examining the plain language of the . . . [Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988)], it is clear that Congress
did not intend to limit the applicability of forum agreement in ADEA cases.").
257. Regarding arbitration see, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991) (enforcing an arbitration clause in an age discrimination claim
invoking ADEA); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 481 (giving effect to arbitration claims invoking the securities acts), overruling
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 227, 242 (validating arbitration agreements under RICO and the Secu-
rities Exchange Act); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632 (enforcing an arbitration clause
invoking antitrust laws).
In the forum selection clause context, see, e.g., Bonny, 3 F.3d at 162 (vali-
dating a forum clause under the Securities Acts and RICO); Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363;
Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1982) (enforcing
a forum agreement regarding an antitrust action); Weiss, 801 F. Supp. at 1281-82
(enforcing a forum clause regarding a claim under ADEA).
258. Cf Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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4. The Private Attorney General Scheme as Statutorily
Preemptive
Does the inclusion of private attorney general provisions in a
certain statute militate against the enforcement of forum selec-
tion clauses on public policy grounds?
Private attorney general provisions are intended to strengthen
the enforcement of statutes incorporating such provisions. By
giving private individuals a prosecutorial role for certain statuto-
ry infringements, the legislature intends to encourage law en-
forcement and provide for a wide vindication of a statute.2 9 If,
however, a private citizen, in light of a forum agreement, is dis-
couraged from pursuing the role of private attorney general, the
clear and centered policy of law enforcement is at risk. Therefore,
the concepts of private attorneys general and forum clauses can
clash.
Another factor that sharpens the conflict is the fact that pri-
vate attorney general schemes contemplate not only the interests
of the individual commencing the action but that of third parties
and that of the public at large. Thus, if the noncontractual court
will enforce the forum clause, notwithstanding its finding that
the plaintiff will not be able to pursue litigation in the designated
forum, the court may sacrifice the interests of third parties and
the public at large.
If public policy is called on to invalidate a forum selection
clause when the role of the private attorney general is hindered,
public policy will operate in the statutory preemption mode, not
in the choice-of-law mode, because the law applicable in the des-
ignated forum could be identical to the law applicable in the
forum in which suit is brought. Notwithstanding a match of ap-
plicable law, the forum clause relegating the parties to the desig-
nated forum still may be held unenforceable. The potential reluc-
tance of plaintiffs in pursuing their private attorneys general
roles if litigation is appropriated to the designated forum is at
issue.
Public policy, the private attorney general scheme and a forum
selection clause were all at issue in Red Bull Associates v. Best
Western International, Inc.2" Red Bull, a limited partnership
which owned and operated a motel in Poughkeepsie, New York,
259. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1967) (per
curiam) ("When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that en-
forcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon
private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law.").
260. 686 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y.), afi'd, 862 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988).
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filed suit against Best Western alleging that its licensing
agreement was terminated by Best Western for racially discrimi-
natory reasons.261 Red Bull's action was based on the civil
rights acts. 62 The action was filed in a federal district court in
New York, despite the existence of a forum agreement between
the parties designating the federal or state courts of Arizona with
exclusive jurisdiction.263 Relying on the forum clause, Best
Western moved to dismiss the suit pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), or, alternatively, to transfer the action
to a federal district court in Arizona pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a).26 Ultimately, the court denied both motions after
holding the forum clause invalid as against public policy.2"
The court noted that Congress, by incorporating the private
attorney general concept into the civil rights laws, intended to
encourage litigation of civil rights claims.2 ' The court respond-
ed to Best Western's contention that the plaintiffs were free to
bring the same action in a federal court in Arizona with an argu-
ment based on the concept of the jury system.2"7 The court ex-
plained that the right of trial by jury makes it of special impor-
tance for the case to be tried by a jury which is local to the trans-
actions and infringements at issue in the suit because a local
jury will be more concerned with the matter of the suit than a
distant jury in a foreign jurisdiction.2" The court also found the
private attorney general role to be the main factor militating
against the enforcement of the forum clause. The court observed:
Plaintiffs were given the status of private attorneys general precisely
because Congress felt that governmental units could not be relied upon to
take the initiative.... In giving private parties a role in the enforcement
of these laws, Congress did not rely upon altruism. It sought to harness
economic self interest. We accordingly find that transferring this litiga-
tion to Arizona would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in
which suit is brought."
9
261. Red Bull, 686 F. Supp. at 448. The licensing agreement was allegedly
terminated because Red Bull provided lodging to Hispanic and African-American
homeless persons. Id. The support of the local welfare department made such lodg-
ing possible. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. The forum agreement stated: 'Unless waived by Best Western in whole
or in part, the Courts located in the State of Arizona, state or Federal, shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims, disputes and actions arising
from or relating to this application and agreement." Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 452.
266. Red Bull, 686 F. Supp. at 451.





Although this argument seemed sufficient to invalidate the
forum clause, the court did not stop there. The court took special
notice of the plaintiffs' declaration that if relegated to litigate in
Arizona they would not pursue their action.17' Therefore, the
public policy behind the private attorney general scheme would
be hindered by the enforcement of a forum agreement which
would prevent or seriously discourage the pursuit of
litigation.27' The plaintiffs' declaration appeared sufficient for
the court to invalidate the forum clause despite its earlier finding
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that it would be impos-
sible for them to litigate in Arizona.27 This lenient standard,
the court explained, was needed because what is at stake is not
only the private right to litigate held by an individual but the
rights embodied in the private attorney general scheme which
cannot be easily waived through a forum selection clause.272
The Red Bull decision, therefore, conceives of the private attor-
ney general scheme as an adequate determinant in invalidating a
forum agreement on public policy grounds. According to the rea-
soning of Red Bull, if the plaintiff is unwilling to pursue litiga-
tion in the designated forum notwithstanding its ability to do so,
the court will still be inclined to invoke public policy to invalidate
the forum clause. However, public policy, as utilized in Red Bull,
seems to depend on the existence of another factor which under-
lined the court's decision. Litigation must be commenced in the
forum in which the cause of action arose. Otherwise, the right to
a jury trial and the plaintiffs willingness to pursue litigation
would have been completely irrelevant to the court's argument.
The Red Bull principle has been severely curtailed by a recent
trend favoring party autonomy in dispute resolution. In a rela-
tively recent decision, the same district court held that the pri-
vate attorney general provision of a statute does not necessarily
preclude enforcement of forum selection clauses. In Weiss v. Co-
lumbia Pictures Television, Inc.,"' the plaintiff, in spite of a fo-
rum agreement designating Los Angeles, California, with exclu-
sive jurisdiction for litigating any dispute concerning his employ-
ment contract, brought an age discrimination suit against his em-
ployer in a federal district court in New York City.27 Relying
on Red Bull, the plaintiff argued that by bringing his action un-
270. Id. at 453.
271. Red Bull, 686 F. Supp. at 453.
272. Id. at 451.
273. Id. at 453.
274. 801 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
275. Weiss, 801 F. Supp. at 1277.
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der the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA")276 he was also assuming the role of a private attorney
general and, therefore, the forum clause should be invalidated on
public policy grounds.27 The court rejected the public policy argument.M
The court first noted that, unlike the situation in Red Bull, the
age discrimination action at issue in Weiss did not implicate, ei-
ther expressly or implicitly, the rights of a third party.279 In
Red Bull, such an implication was made because the civil rights
claim asserted the rights of the current and prospective tenants.
The plaintiff in Weiss asserted a right to personal damages
only.280 The court also recognized that, unlike the plaintiff in
Red Bull, the plaintiff in Weiss was financially capable of pur-
suing his action in a California forum. 8' The court in Weiss re-
lied on the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.,22 which held that age discrimina-
tion claims under ADEA are subject to compulsory arbitration
pursuant to arbitration clauses."s The court reasoned that as
claims brought under ADEA are arbitrable, other district courts
should be able to adjudicate such claims." Furthermore, the
Supreme Court in Gilmer held that the involvement of an admin-
istrative agency in the enforcement of ADEA does not preclude
arbitration under ADEA 5
Interestingly, neither the Weiss court nor the Gilmer Court
were concerned that a person bringing an action under the ADEA
is entitled to a jury trial.8 6
276. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
277. Weiss, 801 F. Supp. at 1280. Under ADEA, the age discrimination claim
could also be pursued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 29 U.S.C.
§ 626.
278. Weiss, 801 F. Supp. at 1281.
279. Id. at 1280.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1280-81.
282. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
283. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
284. The court expressed this analogous conclusion in the following words:
Although forum selection clauses are not the subject of a federal statute com-
pelling their enforcement, the policies underlying the Federal Arbitration Act
are similar to those revealed in the line of Supreme Court cases supporting
the enforcement of forum selection clauses. The purpose of both changes in the
law was to counteract judicial hostility to the enforcement of such contractual
provisions and manifest a liberal policy favoring these types of clauses.
Weiss, 801 F. Supp. at 1281 (citations omitted).
285. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28-29 ([T]he mere involvement of an administrative
agency in the enforcement of a statute is not sufficient to preclude arbitration.");
Weiss, 801 F. Supp. at 1281 (applying the same standard with respect to forum
selection clauses).
286. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(cX2).
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In sum, the Weiss decision reflects the current trend regarding
the ramifications of the private attorney general role on the en-
forcement of forum agreements. This assessment is supported by
the fact that the inclusion of private attorney general provisions
in other statutes has not produced a public policy against the
enforcement of forum clauses. The antitrust statutes, for exam-
ple, authorize private individuals and governmental units to
prosecute different antitrust activities."7 The prosecutorial role
given private plaintiffs under the antitrust laws earned such
plaintiffs the title of "private attorneys general."2" Courts, how-
ever, did not call upon public policy to invalidate forum selection
clauses regarding actions invoking American antitrust legisla-
tion."
Moreover, the risk of diminishing third party rights if litiga-
tion is not pursued by a private attorney general also appears
insufficient as public policy to invalidate forum agreements. Anti-
trust and securities laws are intended to protect third party in-
terests and those of the public at large.29 Claims under these
enactments, however, are not considered immune from forum
clauses. Public policy is not called on to invalidate a forum clause
on the basis that the cause of action was created to protect third
party interests. If third party interests are of special importance
and are at risk of being severely negated, in light of the forum
clause, the governmental unit should, and probably would, initi-
ate prosecution and not depend on the private attorney general.
In sum, Red Bull presently does not have much authority.2 " '
The trend is clearly in favor of enforcing forum clauses, notwith-
standing the private attorney general role.
287. Generally, antitrust statues are enforced by federal enforcement agen-
cies-the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission-the attorneys general of the individual states and private plaintiffs. See
ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND EcO-
NOMICS 130 (1993). Every entity is empowered to prosecute for certain antitrust
claims, though at times concurrent prosecuting authority is present. Id. at 130-36.
Regarding private individuals, the Clayton Act grants any person who has been
injured in business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
the right to sue and recover treble damages and costs of the suit including reason-
able attorney's fee. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1988). The Clayton Act also grants a private
plaintiff the right to seek injunctive relief. Id. § 15c.
288. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 287, at 133.
289. Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718, 720-22 (2d Cir.
1982). Cf Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
629 (1985) (enforcing an arbitration clause invoking antitrust laws).
290. See Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exports Ltd., 28 F.3d 600, 603
(7th Cir. 1994) (antitrust and securities laws are designed for the benefit of consum-
ers).
291. See Solimine, supra note 58, at 95 ("Red Bull seems to be anomalous.").
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B. Choice-of-Law Mode-The Outward Focus of Public Policy
When there is no statutory preemption of a forum selection
clause, it is necessary to inquire whether the forum clause will be
invalidated in light of the substantive law applicable in the desig-
nated forum. This has been identified as the outward focus of
public policy. Such a mode of operation resembles the traditional
usage of the public policy doctrine in the choice-of-laws context.
In the choice-of-laws context, public policy is a shield-like legal
device which protects a forum from the enforcement of foreign
law when such enforcement is called for by the regular choice-of-
law rules.
In light of the resemblance between the function of public
policy in the context of choice-of-laws and that in which the doc-
trine operates in the sphere of forum agreements, the fundamen-
tal rules already designed for public policy in the choice-of-laws
context may help in assessing the application of the public policy
exception to the enforcement of forum selection clauses. For in-
stance, the rule that the forum should apply its own public policy
and not that of another jurisdiction29 could be utilized in the
forum clause context. Thus, if the forum in which action is
brought is the contractual forum, and the forum is asked not to
enforce the forum selection clause because the public policy of
another jurisdiction requires that litigation be held there, such
an argument is to be dismissed. As already stated, by accepting
such an argument the forum will be implementing the public
policy of another jurisdiction-a course rejected thus far by
choice-of-laws principles.293
Another ground rule, which also has its origins in the choice-
of-law context of public policy is that a mere difference between
the forum's law, also known as the lex fori, and that of the desig-
nated forum is not sufficient to warrant the nonenforcement of
the forum agreement. The Second Circuit demonstrated this
proposition in Roby, when it observed:
It defies reason to suggest that a plaintiff may circumvent forum selec-
tion and arbitration clauses merely by stating claims under laws not
292. See supra Section II.B.2.
293. This explains why, in considering the type of a forum clause-exclusive or
nonexclusive-vis-a-vis the forum considering the enforcement of the clause, this hy-
pothetical was not considered.
The defendant in such a setting could argue against enforcement based on
forum non conveniens-a § 1404(a) transfer. However, as indicated earlier, such a
possibility is more theoretical than realistic. See supra Section II.
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recognized by the forum selected in the agreement. A plaintiff simply
would have to allege violations of his country's tort law or his country's
statutory law or his country's property law in order to render nugatory
any forum selection clause that implicitly or explicitly required the appli-
cation of the law of another jurisdiction."
Moreover, if the plaintiffs claim invokes laws fundamentally
American, such as antitrust and securities laws, a clause relegat-
ing an American plaintiff to a foreign tribunal in which foreign
laws are to be applied is not inherently invalid.29 The determi-
native inquiry asks whether the law applicable in the designated
forum affords the plaintiff a sufficient remedy. The Seventh
Circuit's recent decision in Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's29 illus-
trates how the adequacy of remedies awarded in the designated
forum prove to be fundamental. In Bonny, as in Roby, the action
was brought by Americans who invested in the insurance market
run by Lloyd's.2" The Bonny plaintiffs argued that they were
fraudulently induced to invest in Lloyd's.2" It was alleged that
Lloyd's, through its agents, Who were also named as defendants,
failed to disclose material facts and risk factors concerning the
investment.29 The Bonny claims were brought under the Secu-
rities Acts of 1933 and 1934, RICO, common law fraud, negli-
gence and breach of duty."'0
Lloyd's and its agents motioned to dismiss the suit based on a
forum selection clause and an arbitration provision designating
England as the forum for litigation?0 The agreements also pro-
vided a choice-of-law clause in favor of English law concerning all
matters connected with plaintiffs investment with Lloyd's.'
The plaintiffs argued against dismissal, claiming that the fo-
294. Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360 (2d Cir. 1993). See
also Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992); Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione,
858 F.2d 905, 915 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989); Medoil Corp.
v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
295. See Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993) (claim
invoking securities acts and RICO); Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363 (claims invoking the
securities acts and RICO); Riley, 969 F.2d at 958 (claim invoking the securities acts);
AVC Nederland BY. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 146, 155-160 (2d Cir.
1984) (claims invoking the securities acts); cf Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (enforcing an arbitration clause
invoking antitrust laws).
296. 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993).
297. Bonny, 3 F.3d at 158.
298. Id. at 159.
299. Id.
300. id.
301. Id. at 157.
302. Bonny, 3 F.3d at 158 n.4.
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rum selection and the choice-of-law clauses violated the anti-
waiver provisions of the securities acts and, therefore, were void
as against public policy."' The district court and the Seventh
Circuit, in a de novo review, rejected the plaintiffs public policy
argument and consequently enforced the forum clause.'"
The Seventh Circuit, after stressing The Bremen's favorable
attitude toward the enforcement of forum selection clauses,"
emphasized that by including anti-waiver provisions in the secu-
rities laws, Congress intended that the public policy embodied in
such enactments should not be thwarted.06 The determinative
issue concerning the applicability of public policy was the nature
and substance of the law in the contractual forum. If the reme-
dies available in the selected forum did not subvert the public
policy of the securities laws, the forum agreements would be en-
forced.307 Recourse to English law was of fundamental impor-
tance in Bonny because, as in Roby, which was distinguishable
from Riley, the American investors were solicited in the United
States. 8
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit inquired into English law and
found that it provided the plaintiffs with a cause of action for
fraud and a claim for recision if made in reliance on misrepresen-
tation.3 Furthermore, English law was found to embody crimi-
nal sanctions for misleading statements or omissions made know-
ingly or recklessly."0 Relying on these aspects of English
law,3" ' English law was found to provide adequate remedies
and deter issuers from deceiving American investors.1 English
law did not offend American public policy despite the fact that
American law provided the plaintiffs with a greater chance of
success and promoted American public policy. 13 Neither was
sufficient to hold the forum clause as against public policy when
English law was found to offer adequate relief.
303. Id. at 159.
304. Id. at 161.
305. Id. at 159-160.
306. Id. at 160-61.
307. Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161.
308. Id. at 158. The Bonny plaintiffs traveled to England only to sign the
agreement. ld.
309. Id. at 161.
310. Id.
311. The court also discussed the applicability of another English enactment,
the Lloyd's Act of 1982, and whether this act barred the plaintiffs' action if pursued
in English courts. Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161-62. The court seemed to be relieved that
Lloyd's stipulated that it would not raise such a defense, especially after finding
that an English court would not raise the bar sua sponte. Id.




The Bonny decision raises an important issue essential to the
assessment of the applicability of the choice-of-law mode of the
public policy exception. The issue concerns the nature of the law
applicable in the designated forum. As the Bonny decision dem-
onstrates, the applicable law in the selected forum is of funda-
mental importance in determining whether to invoke the public
policy exception to invalidate the forum agreement.314 If, for in-
stance, English law did not provide a remedy for the American
plaintiffs, thereby leaving Lloyd's and its agents legally immune
from liability, the Seventh Circuit would have invalidated the
forum clause as against public policy. The fact that such a legal
reality might prove to be an economic disincentive for prospective
investors in Lloyd's did not constitute an ample substitute to an
actual normative deterrence. In turn, the choice-of-law mode
required the court to engage in a choice-of-law assessment, as if
it were filling the shoes of the designated court and using the
choice-of-law rules of the designated forum-a mode which re-
sembles the operation of the renvoi doctrine. 5 In other words,
the noncontractual court is required to assess the prospective
outcome of litigation if the dispute were to be resolved by the
contractual forum.
In Bonny, the agreement itself provided for the application of
English law, and the Seventh Circuit assumed, without discus-
sion, that this choice-of-law clause would be enforced by the Eng-
lish court." ' If, however, the agreement in Bonny did not in-
clude a choice-of-law clause, the Seventh Circuit would have
made a choice-of-law determination according to English conflicts
rules. Only then would the court be able to determine the pros-
pect of litigation in the designated forum, and whether the law
applied would be repugnant to American public policy.
It is possible that the designated forum, in accordance with its
choice-of-law rules, will apply the federal or state law of the
United Sates to the controversy. " Would such an outcome ren-
314. See also Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1364-66 (2d Cir.
1993).
315. The renvoi doctrine is a legal device utilized by some jurisdictions in the
choice-of-law process when it is required to apply the law of another jurisdiction.
Should such an application include the choice-of-law rules of the other jurisdiction as
well as its municipal laws? If the forum is also required to refer to the foreign
jurisdiction's choice-of-law rules, thus recognizing renvoi, in essence it is handling
the dispute just as the foreign court would have. It is at this stage that the choice-
of-law mode of operation of the public policy exception and the renvoi doctrine in-
teract. For a thorough overview of the doctrine see SCOLES & HAY, supra note 29,
at 67-72.
316. English conflict-of-law rules recognize the effectiveness of choice-of-law
clauses. Farquharson, supra note 6, at 88-93.
317. In terms of the renvoi doctrine, such a reference is called remission.
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der the forum clause invalid as against public policy? The Sev-
enth Circuit, in Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exports
Ltd.,18 answered in the negative. In Omron, a British manufac-
ture, Maclaren, and an American distributor, Omron, designated
the High Court of Justice in England to have exclusive jurisdic-
tion concerning all disputes that arose between them. 19 In
spite of the forum clause, Omron initiated its action in a United
States district court claiming trademark infringements on the
part of Maclaren."2 ° In response to Maclaren's motion to dismiss
the suit on the basis of the forum selection clause, Omron argued
that litigation in England would offend the public policy of the
United States.3"' Omron reasoned that American policy dictates
that disputes should be sent to courts that have expertise to re-
solve them and that laws designed for the protection of American
consumers should be interpreted by courts that have the interest
of Americans at heart. 2 The Seventh Circuit dismissed the
public policy contention. In its decision, the Seventh Circuit as-
sumed that the applicable law was that of the United States even
though England was selected in the forum selection clause. To
the Seventh Circuit, the fact that an English court would apply
United States federal trademark law did not constitute an imped-
iment.3" The court made it clear that not every dispute apply-
ing the laws of the United States must be decided by a court of
the United States.2 4
Therefore, the noncontractual forum, when considering the
choice-of-law mode of the public policy exception to the enforce-
ment of an exclusive forum selection clause, must make a choice-
of-law determination as made in the designated forum. If the law
applicable in the selected forum is founded upon immoral or il-
legal standards, an American court will hold the forum selection
clause invalid as against public policy." However, this proposi-
tion is true only if there is some meaningful relationship between
ScOLEs & HAY, supra note 29, at 67. If reference is made to a third jurisdiction, it
is called transmission. Id.
318. 28 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 1994).
319. Omron, 28 F.3d at 601-02.
320. Omron contracted with Maclaren to distribute baby strollers manufactured
by Maclaren. Omron, 28 F.3d at 601. Maclaren terminated the agreement and re-
tained possession of 2,300 strollers that had the trademarks of both Omron and
Maclaren. Id. Maclaren attempted to conceal the Omron trademark and this
sparked the trademark infringement action brought by Omron. Id.
321. Omron, 28 F.3d at 603.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 602.




the controversy and the forum asked to enforce the forum agree-
ment. As already pointed out, if the relationship between the
controversy and the forum scores poorly on the intensity of rela-
tionship test, the court will be less willing to apply its legal stan-
dards and norms instead of those of the designated forum.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is evident that public policy continues to influence the en-
forcement of forum selection clauses. Although the doctrine no
longer opposes the concept of forum agreements, it managed to
carve out room for itself after American courts reconciled with
the concept of forum agreements and encouraged party autonomy
in dispute resolution.
Traditionally, the public policy doctrine has been disliked sim-
ply because it was too broad for confinement. Indeed, public poli-
cy is far from being a simple concept to grasp. However, when
examined through defined legal concepts, the doctrine is much
more manageable. As public policy has been compared to an
"unruly" horse, the horse would be tamer if it were brought with-
in the confines of a stable. The purpose of this article was to do
just that. After pointing out the different modes in which public
policy operates in the context of forum agreements and the fac-
tors relevant to its assessment, it is hoped that the doctrine is
more workable and is not as vague and uncertain as it has been
traditionally considered.
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